Harvest After the Drought

Two consecutive seasons failed. In the second, households were eating one meal a day by the end of the dry months, and several had sold the tools they would need to plant again.

The third season delivered rain. That was not our doing. What we can speak to is why this community was in a position to make use of it.

Three things that were already in place

1. A community seed reserve, held locally and drawn on at planting rather than sold during the hungry months.
2. Improved storage — simple sealed containers that cut the losses previously taken to damp and pests after harvest.
3. Drought-tolerant varieties trialled on small plots over the previous two years, so households had seen them work before committing a whole field.

None of those are dramatic. All three were unglamorous preparation done in advance of a crisis, which is the hardest kind of work to fund and the most valuable when the crisis arrives.

Relief that did not undercut the recovery

We did provide food support through the worst of the second year. How that was done mattered: it was bought from traders within the same district wherever markets were still functioning.

Importing food into a region where farmers are trying to sell food depresses the price they can get and can deepen the problem it is meant to relieve. Buying locally is slower and involves more paperwork. It also means the money circulates rather than leaving.

What has not been solved

One good harvest does not constitute resilience. Households sold assets in the drought that they have not replaced, and debts taken on during it are still being repaid. The next failed season would find them less prepared than this one did.

So the work now is unromantic: rebuilding the seed reserve, expanding storage to more households, and helping the farmers' group negotiate a better price by selling together rather than individually at the gate.